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Since the death of former Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in
December 1999 and the  overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in
October 2000, it has become commonplace to talk about  “the
Aftermath of the Yugoslav Wars of Succession,” as if the wars and
chaos of the past  decade in Southeastern Europe were mainly
driven by these two men, and now that they are  gone, peace and
democracy will inevitably follow, and international policy in the
region can  now be considered successful. Richard Holbrooke, for
instance, claimed that “Yugoslavia’s  tragedy was not foreor-
dained. It was the product of bad, even criminal, political leaders
who  encouraged ethnic confrontation for personal, political, and
financial gain.”1 Along similar  lines, Warren Zimmerman has
noted that “Yugoslavia’s death and the violence that followed
resulted from the conscious actions of nationalist leaders who
coopted, intimidated,  circumvented, or eliminated all opposition
to their demagogic designs. Yugoslavia was  destroyed from the
top down.”2 A rather confused version of this argument is provid-
ed in a  review of the Balkans by the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), which claims  that due to Milosevic’s over-
throw, “Although terrorist incidents and localized violence will
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continue “in the Balkans”, the Balkan wars, which repeated them-
selves with terrifying  monotony during the last century, are now
over.”3 Here we have a perfect contradiction: now  that Milosevic
is gone, there will be no more war in the Balkans, even though
these wars  repeated themselves “with terrifying monotony” for at
least 85 years before Milosevic came  to power.
In this paper I would like to argue something quite different.
First, I will argue that the  international community has had rela-
tively little success in its attempt to control  developments in
Southeastern Europe. Second, I will argue that that the reason why
the  international community has been unable to control develop-
ments in the region is because of  a fundamental misunderstand-
ing or misinterpretation of what has been driving the process of
the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Third, I want to argue
that the crisis in  Southeastern Europe—if we define crisis to mean
the struggle to create and sustain stable  democratic states— is far
from over.
I. Judging the Success of International Policy
After more than a decade, most of the problems facing the states
of the former Yugoslavia  still have not been resolved. What has
changed over the past ten years is that the locus of the  crisis has
shifted from the northeast - Slovenia and Croatia - to the south-
west - Bosnia &  Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(including Kosovo and Montenegro), and  Macedonia. Even
Albania has been in a state of almost chronic instability since
1997. And in this latter group, the political, constitutional, and
state questions which were open at the  beginning of the 1990s
are far from resolved.
Looking over the events of the past decade, I would argue that
the international  community has had relatively little success in fos-
tering stability, or imposing its will, on the  peoples and states of
the region. International diplomats were unable to prevent the
breakup  of the former Yugoslavia, and it took 43 months to bring
the fighting in Bosnia to an end (and  then largely on terms unac-
ceptable to the local factions). Postwar experiments in nation-
building, state-building, and running international protectorates in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have proven disappointing
(to say the least). And despite 10 years of advance  warning, inter-
national diplomacy was unable to prevent the wars in either
Kosovo or  Macedonia.
Moreover, despite the “international community’s” official
policy and rhetoric about  supporting multi-ethnicity and multieth-
nic states, over the past decade the international  community has
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presided over the formation of ever-smaller mono-ethnic entities.
Thus, the  former multi-ethnic Yugoslavia has been replaced by a
host of states and para-states that are  now over 90 percent
mono-ethnic - Slovenia, Croatia, Republika Srpska, Herceg
Bosna,  Bosniac-Bosnia, and Kosovo. And we have yet to see what
will happen to the rest of the FRY  and Macedonia.
II. Misunderstanding History
Instead of simply criticizing international efforts in Southeastern
Europe or placing  the blame for events over the past ten years on
one or two individuals, what I would argue is  that the events of
the past decade are part of an historical and social process that
cannot be  controlled by the international community, given the
limited resources it is willing to devote  to the region. As Gale
Stokes, a prominent historian of Eastern Europe, has described
this process,
Remapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one of the
major threads of postFrench Revolutionary European history.
The process began with the unifications of  Italy and
Germany, ran through the creation of new states at the end of
World War I,  and had its most catastrophic outcomes at the
end of World War II with the Holocaust  and the expulsion of
the Germans from Eastern Europe . . . the wars of Yugoslav
succession are not some aberrant Balkan phenomenon; they
are the last stages of a  process of European redefinition that
has been going on since the French revolution.4
Indeed, as Istvan Deak adds, “the creation of nation-states
has been so much a part of modern  European history as to allow
us to call it inevitable.”5 If this school of thought is a correct  inter-
pretation of modern European history, and I believe it is, then the
possibilities for  creating stable multiethnic societies in
Southeastern Europe are dim. But, unfortunately, I  believe that the
effort to create even stable mono-ethnic democracies in
Southeastern Europe  is going to be extremely difficult for the fore-
seeable future.
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III. Factors Inhibiting Stability in Southeastern Europe
What are the factors or realities on the ground that are inhibiting
or preventing the  emergence of stable democracies in
Southeastern Europe? I would argue that they fall into  three cat-
egories. The first is the overall level of poverty among the popu-
lation of the region,  and the weak state of the local economies.
The second is the existence of weak governments using weak
and/or ineffective political mechanisms. The third category of
problems is that  most of the existing states/governments lack
popular legitimacy. We are unlikely to see major  improvements in
any of these categories in the immediate future. Let me now exam-
ine each  of these categories in turn.
The first category of problems facing states in the region is the
depressed state of their  economies. To emphasize the importance
of a strong economy for the maintenance of a stable  democracy,
let me cite the words of a recent study on the Balkans:
Few concepts in political science have been as widely accept-
ed (particularly in the  Western world) as the idea that socio-
economic well-being is the crucial foundation of  a sound
democracy. The formation and growth of a middle class
through robust  economic development is considered to be
the bulwark of democratic stability.6
Unfortunately, the reality of Southeastern Europe at this point
in time suggests that the  economies of the region are far from
being able to support or sustain a robust middle class, as  income
disparities and the gap between rich and poor have both widened
over the past ten  years. Regional unemployment (according to
official statistics) is approximately 30 percentcountry by country, it
ranges anywhere from 20 percent in Croatia to 60 percent in
Kosovo.  Living standards in most of the former Yugoslavia have
declined by 30-50 percent over the  past decade. Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo have suffered signifi-
cant  damage to their economic infrastructures due to war. Most
of these countries suffer from a  high degree of dependence on
foreign aid. In Albania, 9 percent of GDP comes from foreign
aid. In Montenegro, the state budget for the current fiscal year is
approximately $90 million.  Coincidentally (or perhaps not)
Montenegro is also receiving approximately $90 million in  aid
from the EU and the US this year. And, of course, the provision of
public services in  Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo is almost com-
pletely dependent upon the international  community.
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Most of these countries are also suffering from a serious out-
flow of educated, talented  young people, the so-called “brain
drain.” In Albania, 40 percent of the teachers have left the  coun-
try since 1992. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a recent poll reported that
62 percent of the  country’s young people would leave if they had
a way out. It bears stressing here that if these  countries are going
to have a successful democratic transition, they are losing that
part of the  population most likely to carry it out. Refugees and dis-
placed persons continue to cause  severe economic and social
problems throughout the region. The devastated FRY economy is
currently supporting the largest refugee population in Europe. The
Bosnian economy is  currently supporting over 500,000 internal-
ly-displaced persons, and the number of refugees  and displaced
persons from the fighting in Macedonia is growing every week.
A final problem regarding these economies is the phenome-
non and extent of  organized crime in these societies. Milosevic’s
Serbia, Djukanovic’s Montenegro, and  NATO’s Kosovo are the
worst examples of this problem, but Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina,
Croatia, and Macedonia have significant and serious problems
here as well. The extent and  strength of organized crime syndi-
cates in the region is so severe that some observers claim  they are
the main impediment to a successful democratic transition in the
region. As the  former chief of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Ambassador Robert Barry,  recently noted:
Organized crime and corruption are a more serious threat to
security and stability than  military forces. The growing nexus
between extremist politicians, organized crime, and the for-
mer communist intelligence services is becoming ever
stronger, and this is the single  greatest threat to democratic
reform, economic investment, and membership in Euro-
Atlantic institutions. Rolling back the mafia must be a central
goal of the Stability Pact,  NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.7
Now, the second category of problems: weak governments
handicapped by inefficient  political institutions and mechanisms.
One obvious problem is the fractured party systems  throughout
the region, and the politically polarized populations. In Croatia,
the government is  made up of 5 (until last week, 6) competing
parties. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the  Federation, the govern-
ment is composed of 10 different parties. In Serbia, the DOS
coalition  is made up of 18 different parties, and I’ ve lost track of
how many parties are formally a part  of Macedonia’s current
national unity government. Obviously, unwieldy coalitions made
up  of competing parties will not be able to govern effectively, or
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to agree upon the difficult  decisions needed to implement politi-
cal and economic reform.
The second problem in this category lies in the fact that most
of the governments in the  region (with the exceptions of Albania
and Croatia) are using failed political mechanisms  inherited from
the former Yugoslavia. Here I mean giving sub-state entities high
degrees of  ethnic or territorial autonomy; the use of ethnic vetoes,
parity ethnic representation in  executive, legislative, and judicial
bodies; decision-making by consensus; and collectively  rotating
leaderships. All of these are political mechanisms that failed to
address effectively  the problems of the former Yugoslavia, and
they have not proven successful in post-Dayton  Bosnia-
Herzegovina or in the FRY. Nevertheless, they are still political
“solutions” that the  international community will probably try to
force Macedonia to accept in order to settle the  crisis there.
Finally, the third category of problems inhibiting or preventing
the emergence of stable  democracies is the fact that many of the
existing states in the region lack popular legitimacy  or support. In
Bosnia-Herzegovina, a recent poll found that 72 percent of the
people surveyed  thought the RS should either become an inde-
pendent state or unite with the FRY.8 Similarly,  the results of the
referendum of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina organized in
October 2000  suggest that a large percentage of the Croat pop-
ulation in Bosnia is extremely unhappy with  the current constitu-
tional arrangements there.9 Obviously, the Albanians in Kosovo
have no  desire to remain a part of the FRY, and if anyone is sur-
prised by developments in Macedonia,  it is worth remembering
that Albanians boycotted the country’s 1991 referendum on
independence. Montenegro is reassessing its relationship with
Serbia, and even if  Montenegro does become independent
(which is beginning to seem more and more unlikely)  it will be
against the will of roughly half of its population. Albania also
faces considerable  problems as its attempts to create a viable
state within its current borders face challenges  from those who
would like to see closer ties between Tirana, Pristina, and Tetovo.
And even  though Croatia is now overwhelmingly a mono-ethnic
country, the political system there is  extremely polarized between
members of the current government, which would like to wash
their hands of the Croats in Bosnia, and those who favor a more
active and interventionist  approach in supporting them.
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Conclusions  
What I have argued in this paper is that there are two ways of
understanding the problemsin Southeastern Europe. Much of cur-
rent international policy has been based on the belief  that the
problems in the region have been caused by one or two bad
politicians. Now that  those politicians are gone, peace and har-
mony should characterize the region.
Clearly, however, this is not happening, as the continuing
problems in Macedonia,  Kosovo, the Presevo Valley,
Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina show that these crises
have different roots and different catalysts. What I have instead
proposed in this paper is that  the wars in Southeastern Europe
over the past decade, are, unfortunately, a part of the often
bloody European model of state and nation-building. This is a
process of enormous historical  and social force, and it is naive to
think that a donor’s conference that raises $5 billion, or a  bar-
rage of cruise missiles, can solve these problems in the 3-4 years
between American  presidential campaigns. As Timothy Garton
Ash said in a recent article, “What we are  proposing to do in our
Balkan quasi-protectorates is not just to freeze war. It is to freeze
history.”10 As we all know, however, time waits for no one, not even
for the international  bureaucrats trying to redesign and transform
Southeastern Europe. Consequently, since the  so-called “nation-
al-questions” of many of the ethnic groups of Southeastern
Europe remain  unresolved, I fear instability will characterize the
region for the foreseeable future.
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